Tag: wittgenstein

Writegenstein #8: Examples Over Evidence

Britton William Frost2 Comments

A main cause of philosophical disease – a one-sided diet: one nourishes one’s thinking with only one kind of example.

-Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations, 593)

We already know that sufficient proof is never in empirical observation, but perhaps it is not in the form of the argument either. Sure, logical form gives an argument structure so that it can sustain itself, and that is arguably what is most important (some of us can think in pure conceptual terms, and others simply cannot, we must accept) but proof is not exactly that sort of thing. Rather, proof shows how an argument which is true is true or how an argument which is false is false, and this is done through example.

One will not be very convincing if he can only apply the form of his argument to one kind of example – one category – in which he simply substitutes different objects for the variables contained within the argument form. Different examples are shown through different areas of reference. This requires sufficient nuanced knowledge of two or more areas, and perhaps that is hard to come by, for different areas of study have their own unique vocabularies and require some degree of subjective interest in order to learn. Regardless, if a concept is true, it should have some universal degree of truth to it so that the form of the argument transcends the material realm and therefore can be applied in any observable context. Therefore, there should be no limit to the number of examples one could come up with to show the thrust of the argument.

Writegenstein #7: Disagreement as Misunderstanding

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“611. Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic.”

-Ludwig Wittgenstein (On Certainty)

Disagreements don’t exist — only misunderstandings do — if we take truth to exist. For a relativist, there is no difference between the two.

Furthermore for the relativist, definitions don’t exist at all.

Nor does anything exist for the relativist. To follow relativism through to its conclusion, one must be nihilistic and solipsistic, which are also unsustainable because it would follow that identity itself is impossible.

For one who accepts truth (in conscious thought, that is — for we all do in action), however, understanding is a prerequisite to opinion. An opinion is a sort of judgement. To understand is to have thought critically, and to think critically is to have observed impartially. Few who practice this method would consider their views to be mere opinions, worth just as much consideration as that of one who has no conscious basis.

Have well-reasoned perspectives, not opinions. Some “opinions” have a basis, and some do not, so we should not consider them to be of the same category. When they do, it is by coincidence. What serves as the intentional value determines which is which.

An opinion is never put forth with the intention of being true. It is either a nonsensical impulse or an attempt to be right. It will be fought for by way of rhetoric rather than reasoning. Any tools of reasoning that it employs will be inverted. For example, one might commit the appeal-to-pity fallacy in order to win the argument rather than avoid it as to not be fallacious in one’s reasoning. All well-reasoned perspectives have, at the very least, the intention of truth. Otherwise, the end is chosen at random by man, all means are justified, and logic is inverted to serve that end if it is used at all.

In summary: rhetoric is the art of debate — i.e. inverting logic to persuade someone to your side, for your ends.

Rhetoric, indeed, has a solipsistic aura to it. It is not motivated by what is good for one and for all, but rather for oneself alone. The gain can be of finances, power, status, or the appearance of virtue, all of which are superficial and, in the end, not good for oneself either. It leaves one alone, imprisoned, on one’s own island.

To reason well, by contrast, one’s only concern should be that which is true is revealed. One must be indifferent to the specifics of the outcome. To be virtuous in one’s faith is to believe that what is true is also good — to not allow one’s own motivations to intervene with that inquiry. To be naive in one’s faith is to put one’s trust in the motivations of man.

One should not even trust one’s own motivations if one cannot first observe them.

To be made in the image and likeness of God means that we have all the power we need within us — to discern deception and to speak and act in favor of what is good for good’s sake. To have the power of God within us is to have the power of Truth within us.

God, goodness, and Truth are the same concepts, dressed differently.

Logic itself is not good or true. It is a tool that we have been given with which we can choose good or evil, true or false. The human will is the only entity that possesses the power of good and evil. We have the conscious ability to use our tools for either at any point. To lack this ability is to be imprisoned.

It should be regarded as good that logic does allow us to follow a perspective or opinion through to its conclusion. In a disagreement between two people, no more than one participant is doing this. Disagreement happens when one person has a more tightly knitted sifter for information than the other, so he can see what is relevant and irrelevant more clearly, thus formulating a more solid basis for a perspective. The one who has not tightened the knitting of his filter jumps to conclusions, perhaps not from sifting at all, but from constructing a viewpoint on the basis of his data. This is the composition fallacy.

As we know, a philosophical argument has three parts: assumption, evidence, conclusion. For a reasonable discussion to occur, it treats the assumption(s) as a foundation for the evidence, and so all participants agree on that foundation. If this is not the case, then the discussion should be about that basis itself before moving forward with evidence. Otherwise, the participants will have different ideas about what constitutes evidence to begin with. This will leave the discussion at a stalemate.

It is that which is not being questioned in the argument that should first be understood.

A spiritual being is a truth-centered being. To be spiritual is to value truth and goodness above all and to have intended it even if one falls short of it in action.

To mull over a disagreement is to expect that the other understands what you understand. This is a mistake.

Even if you have put forth your position in clear, logical terms, it may not be the case that your message has been received as you intended. Do not expect anyone to understand. Speak simply and authentically, as if to allow your message to flow through you.

If your message is true, then it is not yours to begin with. You are merely the vessel for truth, so take no offense to how it is received. Anticipate that it will be met with great resistance. Surprise about this will cause you much unnecessary anguish, as will anything that you seek to control but cannot.

Understanding human perception more broadly will afford you forgiveness in particular cases.

Understanding that what is true is good will afford you the willingness to investigate assumptions before the evidence.

It is not your job to convert someone’s assumptive basis, for that might entail a deeper spiritual journey that they are yet to embark upon. One can only pursue that journey from their own will. They may have to experience hell before they enter into that darkness.

To disagree with someone may spark a volatile response. He will, as Wittgenstein implies in the quotation above, commit argumentum ad hominem. This is proof enough that there is something deeper that they misunderstand. They are frustrated neither with you nor your argument, but with themselves. If you engage them, you are showing the same incompetency in your own way, whether it be regarding your assumptions, evidence, or the reasons for their disagreeing and an inability to forgive them for that.

To show indifference toward what they say but concern for why they say it is to love them.

Similarly, to lack the ability to release yourself of their struggle reveals a struggle of your own that you must address. To simply present what you have concluded as true, and step away, is to love yourself.

The paths to both heaven and hell are dark. The latter is guided by one’s own senses, which is to say that one abandons oneself and others in an attempt to serve oneself. The former is guided by intuition — i.e. faith that the light at the end is already self-contained, is also something greater of which one is a part, and is therefore also best for all others involved.

Writegenstein #2: Philosophy of Psychology 205 (Seeing-As)

Britton William FrostLeave a comment

‘How does one play the game: “It could also be this”?

[…] “I see (a) as (b)” might still mean very different things.

Here is a game played by children: they say of a chest, for example, that it is now a house; and thereupon it is interpreted as a house in every detail. A piece of fancy is woven around it.‘

— aphorism 205 of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s “Philosophy of Psychology” from Philosophical Investigations

It could be this and I see (a) as (b) point to different ways in which one could interpret a material object. That object alone has limited value, if any at all. In a sense, the material aspects of the object are arbitrary compared to the conceptualization of the object on the whole. What is conceptualized of it, i.e. how it is understood, depends on its place in its environment – what use it is to its environment. When children are playing house, they are playing a game. They see a chest as something to use in a game which mimics the game the child sees its parents playing daily and of which they are a part. They do not see it as something with material, mechanical parts as the builder might see it (that is what it would mean simply to see, though the builder may see the bigger picture as well.) They ask “What can we do with this?” and understand the chest to be a house, having already established, and taken for granted, the rules for what constitutes a house.

It does not end there. Playing the game of house is itself a very sophisticated perceptual process. Our ability to formulate and make use of abstraction is perhaps what separates human perception from the perception of other animals – not in terms of form, importantly, but in terms of degree. A cat, for example, will definitely see the chest as something other than a bundle of wood and nails assembled in a particular way. It will almost certainly see it as a scratching post or a place on which or in which to sit or sleep (depending on whether the chest is open or closed and on how tired the cat is), but the cat lacks the ability to conceptualize the chest as anything more than that with which it is afforded these very basic “cativities”, if you will. The reason for this, from an evolutionary standpoint, is that these cativities are all the cat needs to achieve its potential. So, the cat’s abstraction is of the same sort but of a much lower degree than that of the child. The cat’s abstraction is more like that of an infant’s than the young child’s, for an infant, like the cat, only seeks in objects the fulfillment of very basic needs. The only difference between the cat and the infant is the potential of growth and development.

One still might ask “what objective or quantifiable relation is there between a chest and a house?” One should see now, unless one is blinded by a materialist view of reality, that this question now becomes arbitrary because one cannot speak of perception in this example without qualifying the individual subjects’ understanding of it. Perception as we experience it does not seem to be a mere material process. One does not need to understand anything about brain matter to understand something. In fact, it is that understanding that is indeed the goal. One could say that in the cat’s mind there is very little understanding taking place at all, while in the child’s mind there is no limit, especially since the child’s capability for abstract thought will continue to develop. The child understands much more than the cat does. To understand an object, I should say, is to make an abstraction of it – an abstraction that has utility in the greater context of its environment – to allow one to be successful at a game. To see-as, then, is to understand, and vise versa.

On the Categorization of Terms

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It seems that, since he characterizes language as a whole rather than dealing with the nature of individual words, later-Wittgenstein denies the existence of classes of objects, and thus our accuracy in creating language about them. For example, instead of recognizing the chair as a chair, we would simply recognize the chair as that chair. If his view is accurate, then I think categorization would be better suited for proper nouns rather than objects such as a chair, because reference accuracy in these cases is naturally much more clear, i.e. apply names to named individuals (e.g. Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein). There are many different forms that something we call a chair can take. Of course, as Wittgenstein would agree, there is an endless realm of possible connotations of ‘chair’, but there are certainly objects that we could exclude from the class of ‘chair’, such as a baseball, so there are some current methods of usage by which we must abide when speaking of a chair. However, with the exception of those cases that we can very obviously include and exclude from being connoted by ‘chair’, there are plenty other cases (e.g. a “chair” nailed upside down to the ceiling of an art gallery) that are not so obvious, despite their form or function. At least with individual persons, we know exactly what one is referring to when he mentions ‘Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein’, and we know that he is excluding everything that is not Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein. The line is more clear with proper names. With everything else, not so much. Therefore, categories are irrelevant from a philosophical standpoint and need not exist at all. They only exist within a specific context.

However, more generally, if we apply the word ‘chair’ to a baseball, and if the majority of language-users, after using the term ‘chair’ to refer to a baseball by way of its constant usage in that context, eventually came to use ‘chair’ to connote a baseball (out of unconscious social habit, not conscious agreement), then this would have become an acceptable definition, or use, of ‘chair’. For now, this is not the case. If we used ‘chair’ to connote a baseball, we would not be adhering to chair’s current method of usage, and that usage would be rejected in a social and definitive light and thus in this philosophical one. Though, after much such usage, very gradually, and not at any one particular moment, ‘chair’ could certainly come to connote a baseball. It would, at that point, have become a collective social habit and therefore semantically correct.

Syntax = Semantics

Current Methods of Usage can be applied to both syntactical and semantic rules. In fact, it has deeper implications that there is very little difference, if any at all, between the functions of syntax and semantics.

We traditionally think of syntax as being the grammatical rules of language: punctuation, spelling, sentence structure, etc. Such rules formalize language so our expressions are precise and easily understood. Semantics, on the other hand, is supposed to deal with reference and connotation. The forms, but only the forms, of syntax and semantics are different. However, their functions (which is to say ‘their purpose’) point to the same thing: communication. One can arguably not exist without the other if effective communication is to occur. Syntax and semantics are dependent upon one another like two sides to the same coin. One side is not worth more than the other (as Tractatus would argue that syntax would carry more weight, and semantics is simply incidental). They are both necessary for communication, and therefore, equal in value, especially in spoken language. They are like categories, as described above, and therefore have no philosophical value per se.

Current Methods of Usage – The “Private Language” Question and a Modern Example

Britton William Frost3 Comments

To imagine how the meaning of terms evolve, we can use the word ‘gay’ as an example. It was originally an adjective used to refer to one who is happy, joyful, carefree, and very open-minded. It has been by virtue of usage, not definition, over the last century, that it has come to mean ‘homosexual.’ ‘Gay’ was once and then gradually very often used to mean ‘homosexual’ until the new meaning became the formal definition. Even today, in very slang contexts, ‘gay’ can be synonymous with a long list of words, depending on the context. This, as we know, has happened with many other words and phrases as well.

Of course, those other meanings for ‘gay’ are often slang and derogatory (e.g. in the conservative south, where homosexuality is not openly accepted). This is not a problem of language, but a problem of social human psychology. Perhaps I will further address this in a later post. For now, though, keep this (‘gay’) example in mind, for I will be returning to it soon.

The “Private Language” Question

Society would not be able to determine meaning or even function without shared customs which Wittgenstein calls forms of life. There are a countless number of forms of life which help shape meaning of language. Remember, language is a social activity, a game, a tool, and a means by which we interact. It is not by any means a universal entity because it cannot exist without the conformity of men. Therefore, later-Wittgenstein would claim, the creation of a private language is not possible.

Immediately, one might think otherwise. Is it not possible for an individual to create a private language that only he could understand? Perhaps with time it would actually be quite simple. One could easily create a private language using an interpretation of the modern Latin alphabet to form its words, such as English does. In the same way that John Locke says we come to understand meaning (from in the head), we can formulate a language by first creating words from an alphabet, assigning to them definitions, and then we would structure their usage by establishing syntactical rules. One might claim that even later-Wittgenstein should agree that this is possible provided that these definitions and rules are subject to change at any moment, which would certainly be the case once the language was taught to a group of people and then put to use. This may seem convincing, but there is an enormous problem here.

To argue that a truly-private language, in this sense, is possible is to argue something that cannot be proven. In fact, it is far more reasonable to bet in favor of the contrary. To even consider that a private language, which resembles our own to any degree, can be created is a naive over-simplification of language. We can only make this claim on the basis of what we already know about language: writing and recognizing symbols which represent sounds which can be formed into words that we assign definitions to. This is the method we have always used. It is habit, and in some sense, an ideology, that we take for granted.

As we humans have evolved, our language has evolved. We have obviously very extensively built off of caveman muttering to form the complex languages we have today. Ultimately, though, if recorded history allowed, even the most complex languages could be traced back to muttering. Indeed, each individual begins learning language as a muttering infant. More generally, this is how language began altogether.

Perhaps this “private language” question cannot be answered with absolute certainty, for you still may not be convinced, but one thing is certain: to claim, outright, that a private language can be created simply by developing an alphabet, formulating sounds and words, and assigning definitions to those words is extremely naive. We would be too closely relating our reality to the theoretical, and we would be admitting our ignorance of our own linguistic nature.

This all does not mean we should not speculate, of course. But keep in mind that, crucially, any attempt to speculate requires a conversation – a sharing of ideas. Participating in such a conversation would be to make even more clear that language works in the way that I (and later-Wittgenstein) am trying to explain.

Current Methods of Usage

Suppose that, through any means whatsoever, a private language can be created. I don’t know about you, but I can still accept Wittgenstein’s idea that, over time, fluidity of the new language would certainly occur, but the rules and meanings would change with it, and at any given moment, there are in fact present rules by which language must be used if we are to communicate effectively. Indeed, this is how any language, private or not, works. These rules are what I call the current methods of usage. Going back to a previous example, the word ‘gay’ used to have a different meaning and usage than it does today, but one individual cannot spontaneously decide to begin to use a word in a manner that steers too far away from its current method of usage (i.e. how it must be used at the present moment in time for communication to occur between one or more person).

Although usage, as later-Wittgenstein would say, caused the gradual shift in meaning of the word ‘gay’, it would be improper, incorrect, and not socially acceptable now to use the word ‘gay’ according to its previous definition. Not because the dictionary disagrees (remember, definitions are not rules of meaning), but because such usage of the term would be misunderstood in virtually any social setting. Miscommunication would occur. The general current method of usage of ‘gay’ suggests that it currently means ‘homosexual’ and by using it to mean ‘happy, outgoing, and open-minded’, we are very arguably no longer using the word properly. We are not conforming to the rules of the established language game. Communication requires some level of mutual understanding. I expect that absolutely no one reading this will find this arguable.

It should be noted that this is a very general example of “gay’s” current method of usage. There are also very specific, contextual cases where this concept comes into play. When I say that using ‘gay’ according to its former definition is currently improper, I am speaking about the concept’s more general terms. Most people, in most cases, equate ‘gay’ with ‘homosexual’.

Just as ‘gay’ is used and understood in slang as being synonymous with derogatory terms (unfortunately), it can also be used in contexts where it still means ‘joyful, carefree, and open-minded’. An example of this would be a small circle of elderly women, drinking tea on a Sunday afternoon, who describe one of their eighteen-year-old granddaughters as ‘gay’ because she recently got a tattoo. All of the elderly women understand the usage of ‘gay’ in this case. This would seem odd to the granddaughter if she were to walk into the room in the middle of their conversation, for she most likely understands ‘gay’ to mean ‘homosexual’ (because she is up-to-date with the general current method of usage of the term). However, the elderly women are not using ‘gay’ incorrectly because it conforms to their collective understanding that the term means ‘carefree and open-minded’. They are indeed conforming to a specific current method of usage – the method immediately relevant to the context of their conversation. They are playing the same language game. This works because the goal of language usage, communication, has been achieved.

Where Is Meaning?

Britton William Frost1 Comment

Indeed, to deny that Wittgenstein’s later work improves on his early work is to commit two errors: 1) to overlook or submit to the intellectualist nature of Tractatus; 2) to fail to grasp the crucial insight that his later work provides. Tractatus claims that the better one masters the syntax of a language, the broader his experience and understanding of the world. This is a misled intellectualist view because it values the skill of applying language (as a priori) over and above all other skills and, more importantly, the matters themselves to which language is applied (i.e. any set of circumstances in the world that we attempt to describe). I have only seen shallow and insufficient evidence to support this view. After all, it is the things to which language is applied that matter, not the language itself.

Because there are no limits to how one can experience the world, we should never be misled into believing there are strict boundaries that limit our usage of a word. Our statements are an expression of our understanding. Our statements do not dictate understanding, as early-Wittgenstein thought. In fact, by this notion, we should even be allowed to take a word completely out of context, and just as long as we are able to communicate to at least one other person whatever idea is present to us by using that word, even if it is definitively unrelated, then we would not be using that word incorrectly. In fact, whether we realize it or not, we do this very often.

Whether true or untrue, contemporary schools of thought take for granted that meanings are not in the head. However, it seems clear that anyone’s interpretation of meaning is. It would seem that the most we can agree on is that communication occurs when two or more parties agree on meaning, but they could very well be using identical statements to assert two different things.

Perhaps “where is meaning?” is the wrong question to ask. There is nothing out there in the universe that we can observe in any fashion that dictates meaning. There are no dictionary definitions so precise that, from that definition, we are able to connote everything that is included in the word’s realm of possible references. If definitions were this way, i.e. if they served as rules of meaning, then such a dictionary would be so incredibly large, that it could never be printed. Perhaps it would have to be stored online for anyone to access and edit at a moment’s notice, much like Wikipedia. But still, usage among speakers would be dictating the definitions, so what good would these rules be at all? Definitions would begin to overlap more and more until every word would have so many connotations that it would be virtually indistinguishable from several other words. Is this not already the case?

Usage of phrases and words is in a constant state of flux. We collectively, and often unknowingly, adapt to these constant changes so there remains enough continuity for us to effectively communicate what we mean. Since this adaptation process is often subconscious, we need not think about it; we presume meaning by our usage, and we are almost always correct provided we, and those receiving our message, are fluent in that language.

If Tractatus were more accurate than P.I. in describing the fundamental nature of language, then to learn language would require a lot of memorization, much like one “learns” a foreign language in a classroom. This may allow us to learn something about the concepts of a language, but it does not teach us to effectively use the language within societal contexts, so, learning, in this case, would be much more difficult, and for many, impossible.

So, how to we actually learn language? We’ll have to go back to a time that we do not remember, so we must forget everything we now misunderstand about language. I’ll use the most parallel analogy I can think of:

When parents are teaching a child to walk, they do not simply explain to the child how to walk and expect him to be able to do it without practice. Obviously, the child is not yet proficient in grasping such a concept. Nor does a parent grab one of the child’s legs, put it in front of the other, then do the same with the other leg repeatedly, because the child has not yet developed the practical skill of walking, and one cannot learn such a skill in such a forced manner. The child needs a reason to walk, so the parents teach the child to walk by working toward a goal. One parent (let’s say, the father) stands the child up, and the other parent (the mother) kneels down a few feet away, holding her hands out to the child. The father acts as the spotter, and the mother acts as the goal. The child sees his mother, desires to reach her, and he has to walk to get there in the same way that he learned to crawl (or at least his parents will condition him to believe this based on their training methods). The same is true of language. It is the tool we use to communicate because we need to communicate to get what we want or need. We start out, as babies learning language, by blurting out the word ‘bear’ and pointing to our teddy bear in order to achieve the goal of the teddy bear itself. The child says ‘bear’ to express the general idea “I want that teddy bear” or the command “give that teddy bear to me”. He is communicating with the parent in this sense. He is expressing a desire to achieve a goal. He is not merely making a statement (that would be impossible). Language is the road, not the end of the road. There is no language for language’s sake just as there is no walking for walking’s sake. Language is used for a purpose – a goal – in any given situation.

How each person achieves his goal varies greatly. Not all children walk the same. Some are bowlegged, some are pigeon-toed, some drag their feet and trip on their shoelaces, and some cannot walk at all, so they utilize other tools such as wheelchairs. But they each adapt to their handicaps to get what they need – to get from A to B. Likewise, not everyone speaks the same. Some slur their ‘r’s, some pronounce their ‘s’s with a ‘th’ sound, some use poor grammar, and some cannot speak at all, so they learn sign language. Regardless, each adapts to their handicaps and uses language for the same purpose – to communicate.

Language in general is meant to be used practically, not to be merely understood conceptually. Of course, there are logical concepts to understand which will help us be more precise, but the understanding of those concepts is something like our understanding of how to walk: put one foot in front of the other. As long as you practice walking, you will learn the concept of walking to some extent, but it is the act of walking that is fruitful for the individual. Likewise, one learns the concepts of language to the extents that they need to, but only to the extent that they need to. This is why some children (and adults) in school grasp grammar well, and others do not, though they are able to orally communicate to much of the same effect in social and professional circles. Some are more conceptually-minded. Those prefer to master grammar in order to be as precise as possible both in writing and in speech. They will also make better teachers because they can adapt their language usage to a wide range of listeners. Others prefer to stick to practice and master other types of skills, and perhaps they will become better doers. Either way, practice comes prior to understanding in this case (but not necessarily in the case of everything).

And this is the point: It is only in the case that we look to the world that one might be able to explain language. The world is untamed, and so is the way we understand it and attempt to describe it – i.e. so is language itself. We play language games to adapt the meanings of utterances to our world. Otherwise meaning would be of no use to us, and that is certainly not the case.

Logical Reductionism

Britton William FrostLeave a comment

One similarity between Wittgenstein’s two main works, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations, is that, in both, he concerned himself with this very question: “How are we to say what we mean?” However, the reasons for this concern were different in each work, so the question itself changed over time (and this is an example of how meaning changes; the same sentence can mean two different things under different circumstances).

Tractatus took for granted two fundamental assumptions about language: that it has a quantifiable logical construction and that it is causally related to our perception of the world. The latter assumption seems undoubtedly true, but the former, not so much, even though the latter seems to be contingent on the former. He says in 1.1 of Tractatus, “The world is the totality of facts, not things.”, and then in 4.001, “The totality of propositions is the language.” In other  words, if Wittgenstein remains consistent, reality is comprised of all states of affairs about which propositions can be made (in case this is not already clear from my previous description). Language is a puzzle that one must figure out if he is to communicate effectively. One may only think and speak according to those factual states of affairs in the world. That is to say, because language is something of a logical system, one may only think and speak logically. This brings me to the minor concept of this essay: logical reductionism.

Logic: The art of thinking and reasoning in strict accordance with the limitations and incapacities of the human misunderstanding.” -Ambrose Bierce, The Devil’s Dictionary (1911)

Logical reductionism can be broadly defined as “rigid belief in an a priori system, even in contexts which it is inapplicable”. This term is very broad, for it includes any case where a dogmatic ideology guides understanding without exception. Logical reductionism is, in many cases but very generally, similar to the single-cause fallacy. The single-cause fallacy is also called false-dilemma, false cause, correlation-causation, or black-and-white fallacy. It states: because y follows x, then x must have caused y. For example, if a man who is known to have a heart condition dies in his sleep, his family members might conclude that the death was due to a heart attack. The pathologist may or may not be able to confirm this. Regardless, the family have come to an agreement on what the cause of death was, assuming that there was only one cause, when in fact there were probably multiple necessary contributing factors.

The main difference between the single-cause fallacy and logical reductionism is that the former deals with a one’s lack of ability to use a specific type of reasoning, and the latter deals broadly with one’s rigid belief in a system. The latter, as I will explain, is much more problematic.

The type of reasoning that is hindered by the single-cause fallacy is not one that warrants an immediate judgment. Rather, it is a mode of perception that allows one to see multiple possibilities and make connections in an unfamiliar situation. Proponents of Jungian psychology call this mode of perception extroverted intuition (or Ne). The tendency to neglect this perception is called, in some circles of psychology, explanation freeze. Anyone can fall victim to explanation freeze (i.e. get fixated on a singular explanation of a problem), no matter their ability to use Ne, but Jung would suggest that only half of the human population possesses the natural ability to exercise Ne at all, and a only very small percentage can exercise it consciously and effectively. Everyone else is only able to use it to a very small degree or merely act as if they use it. Upon close observation of one’s social environment, this actually seems to be true. Based on the limited formal research that has been done on this by Julia Galef and other contributors at clearthinking.org, it also has great potential to be confirmed. However, I am not making a case for that at this time.

If the ability to use Ne is indeed innate, one cannot have any difficulty in achieving that which he has no potential to achieve (i.e. overcoming single-cause). On the other hand, one’s ability to use extroverted thinking may not be innate, and everyone might have the potential to improve the skill. If this is the case, then everyone would have the potential to exercise Ne with practice. In fact, there are outlets online that can help with this: wi-phi; ClearThinking; YLFI. Either way one should be able to hold the position that it is generally more difficult to overcome logical reductionism than the single-cause fallacy.

A further description of Ne: (People who have a strong tendency for extroverted intuition have been found to naturally exhibit brain activity that is similar to that of someone who is under the influence of a hallucinogen like psilocybin, ayahuasca, or LSD. Despite the public’s general negative attitude toward the use of hallucinogens, they can have some very positive long-term effects. They can broaden one’s scope of the world, allow him to see multiple possibilities in any situation, make him realize the interconnection of humans and nature, etc. This is no delusion, but rather, a unique type of clarity which can, albeit more difficultly, be achieved without the use of such substances. I do not promote the use of hallucinogens mainly because their effects can be achieved through other means (intensive meditation, introspection, etc.). I have only used this example to further explain what it is like to have Ne “brain wiring”. Take it however you prefer.)

Logical Reductionism is more broad than single-cause, but as stated earlier, it is closely related to it. I used the example of the family of the man who died. It should now be clear why their assessment of the death is guided by poor reasoning: They are not medical professionals and do not realize the broad range of issues that normally contribute to an unexpected death. In such a moment of stress, their perception becomes narrow. More generally, they may not have the natural tendency to use Ne to a large extent to begin with. This is fine.

The pathologist, on the other hand, has no excuse (even if he no more possesses the natural ability to use Ne). If he outright agrees that heart attack was the cause of the man’s death, he likely does so for one of two reasons: because he simply wants to satisfy the family so he no longer has to continue the conversation, or because he believes so dogmatically in the practices of pathology that it can provide all of the answers on a strictly biological basis. It is in the latter case that he is being ideological, and therefore committing logical reductionism, whether he is aware of it or not. Either approach to the question is not very professional in my view, especially the latter because it is founded in ignorance. (This is a common problem in medical practice that I may address after further research at some other time.)

Logical reductionism is a widespread epidemic which epitomizes the naivety of human perception. There are no matters in the universe (medical, scientific, philosophical, religious, political, etc.) that can be absolutely confirmed or refuted by the application of an a priori system. To think otherwise is to commit the fallacy of logical reductionism. It is incredibly arrogant to claim that we humans have the potential to understand the nature of anything via systems that we have created for the sole purpose of making it easier for us to relate to those very states of affairs that we previously accepted as unfathomable. Language is not one of those systems. This is precisely what Tractatus gets wrong.

(In Philosophical Investigations, that assumption was done away with. Wittgenstein realized that language is not a puzzle; it is a tool. The challenge to say what we mean is not to figure out something fundamental about the language, but rather to work with others to communicate what we mean on a more holistic, interpersonal level. We use language; we need not deconstruct it.)

In reductive biology, researchers tend to look for specific genes to explain traits, birth deficiencies, and mutations. Genes are thought to be the most elementary autonomous anatomical units. The line of reasoning is that by reducing the condition down to its fundamental parts (simples), then we might gain a fundamental understanding of the whole being (composite). (This line of reasoning commits the fallacy of composition. Composition seeks to prove that the whole is merely the sum of all of its parts. Division seeks to prove the opposite.) The extent of their findings have been merely correlative. The only thing we absolutely know genes to do are to guide the synthesis of proteins. These proteins make up only a portion of DNA and RNA construction. DNA then provides a home base for storage and transmission of “genetic information”. RNA is then required to carry out functions of that information (e.g. traits and maintaining genetic stability of the organism). So, the gene’s role in developing traits is indirect and not very clear. It is something like: If A and X, then B; if B and Y, then C; if C and Z, then D. A (genes), therefore D (traits). It is becoming increasingly clear that reducing a composite to a simple does not help us to explain the broader functions of the composite, and vise-versa.

I’ll use a less complicated example from biology. Different types of cells carry out different and specific types of functions: Red blood cells distribute oxygen throughout the body, white blood cells fight infection, nerve cells transmit sensory impulses to the brain, skin cells shed and regenerate to protect the inside of the body from the outside world, etc. But, do the sum of all of these basic components equate to a human? The answer is ‘no’ because the range of functions that the organism can perform is much more extensive and diverse than that of the sum of all of its constituent parts. The human being (especially the brain) is so complex and mysterious because it cannot be quantified in this way. Any use of mathematics in biology is simply an estimation, and at best, a guideline. To believe otherwise is to commit logical reductionism.

The same is the case with language. Wittgenstein states in Philosophical Investigations:

47. But what are the simple constituent parts of which reality is composed? – What are the simple constituent parts of a chair? – The pieces of wood from which it is assembled? Or the molecules, or the atoms? ‘Simple’ means: not composite. And here is the point: in what sense ‘composite’? It makes no sense at all to speak absolutely of the ‘simple parts of a chair’.

48. …We use the word ‘composite’ (and therefore the word ‘simple’) in an enormous number of different and differently related ways. To the philosophical question ‘Is the visual image of this (chair) composite, and what are its constituent parts?’ the correct answer is ‘That depends on what you understand to be composite. (And that, of course, is not an answer to, but a rejection of, the question.)”

In this later work, Wittgenstein came to deny the existence of simples and composites in the way we describe reality. It would be because of the logic-contingent construction by which we might misunderstand language that we might disagree with him. Language no longer dictates one’s understanding of the world. Rather, the world controls the fluidity of language because the world controls us, whether we are able to admit it or not. Any attempt for us to control the world will have horrific ramifications (e.g. effects of agriculture on climate change). We adapt our language to our world out of necessity.

To be continued…

Current Methods of Usage (Part 2) – The Two Theories

Britton William Frost2 Comments

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus described language as the picture through which we see the world. Reality is everything that is the case – the totality of describable facts and states of affairs. The limits of language, of which there are many, are the limits of one’s overall experience of the world. Seemingly abstract questions such as those of ethics and aesthetics are transcendental and thus not ask-able because their foundations are not in accordance with the states of affairs in the world. Any question that can be asked (according to the current states of affairs in the world) can indeed be answered. We think in terms of logical propositions and express ourselves using those same propositions. This is a difficult process, for language has a unique logical construction, unlike mathematics or logic itself whose propositions are, at best, tautological. Being concise is important. Thinking and speaking are both logical processes. One cannot think or mutter an illogical proposition because such a proposition would not fit into the picture of the world, i.e. language, which at least limits our understanding of it, and at most limits the actual states of affairs that its propositions assert. The greater is one’s proficiency in language, the greater is their overall experience of the world. Language is everything.

That is as concisely as I believe I can put it. I sure hope that, by Wittgenstein’s measure, I am following the rules!

Philosophical Investigations begins with a quote from St. Augustine’s Confessions, which explains how language is first learned by learning the names of objects. You see your parents point to an object, say a word, and you learn to associate the word with the object. This initially seems to resemble Tractatus. For later-Wittgenstein, though, this is only the starting point. Names, and more generally, propositions, no longer pose a problem. It is reasonable to accept that we learn to communicate by pointing to objects while saying a specific word. However, Wittgenstein claims that we cannot create a necessary fundamental relationship between the name of an object and the object itself. Rather, language sets infinitely revisable guidelines for how we communicate, and it is the usage of words that gives them their meaning. For example, suppose a group of builders communicate using a four-word language containing the words ‘block’, ‘pillar’, ‘slab’, and ‘beam’ (Wittgenstein 19). When one builder says one of those words, or any combination of those words to another, he is not merely naming the individual objects. There are certain implied statements based on the usage and context of the words. To say “block” usually implies “fetch me that block”. It could even imply something as extensive as “fetch that block, and then place it here in an upright position.” Any combination of those words can have any combination of implications, and they will be correct just as long as all parties involved in the communication of those words understand those implied statements. Meaning, in this case, deals much more with the overall implications rather than the singular words. Meaning is not bound by the words themselves, but rather by how they are used. They seem to have no boundaries at all because of the endless range of implied statements one can make by saying a single word. This is in part what Wittgenstein refers to as a language game. There is no particular set structure by which we must speak in order to communicate. We play these language games to communicate ideas. In many cases, we can only hope that one receives a message as we mean to send it. The world, not language, is everything. Mastering language will help one in many ways, yes, but one’s problems in the world are more reducible to his individual psychology rather than due to language itself which, as Tractatus claims, has some a priori (self-justifiable) foundation.

By which theory, in the brief descriptions above, are you convinced best explains the nature of language? Though they seem to contradict each other, either one may seem feasible with some thought. At different points, I have been convinced of both for different reasons. However, my agreement with Tractatus was a bit more like my agreement with my daily horoscope. It seemed to make sense only within the confines of a very specific way of thinking. It seemed that the assumptions outweighed the claims they assert. Though Tractatus clearly provides insight, Philosophical Investigations now seems to better describe the ways in which language is actually used in the world. I hope that one will be convinced of this after reading further.

Current Methods of Usage (Part 1) – Introduction

Britton William FrostLeave a comment

At two different points in his life, Ludwig Wittgenstein held conflicting theories about the nature of language. These two philosophies arguably gave rise to two schools of thought, each with an extensive range of subfields, that are still prominent today: analytical and continental (this is why Wittgenstein is so widely considered the most influential philosopher of the twentieth century). We associate Wittgenstein’s early work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, with the analytical school of thought. This work argued for a “picture theory” of language that states that language’s foundations are in the logically constructed picture of the world that we attempt to describe; there is a necessary relationship between terms and the things in the world that they refer to. We associate Wittgenstein’s later work, Philosophical Investigations, with the continental school of thought. This work argued for a much more open-ended theory of language that states that meaning is not fixed; it fluctuates depending on its context. We play language games in order to communicate as precisely as we can within a given context. In either case, saying what we mean is a difficult task.

My purpose in this essay is to show that Wittgenstein’s two theories of language can, in some sense, coexist. If I am successful, one should be able to infer that the respective schools of thought that they gave rise to must coexist if we are to advance thought. Perhaps I will elaborate on the latter point at a later date, but for now, I will defend the former by devising two concepts. The first concept is called the logical-reductionism fallacy, which will expose the problems of applying strict a priori ideals to meaning, in this case, as applied to language. The second concept, which will be the focus of this essay, is called current methods of usage. It states that there is indeed a proper way to use language in a particular time and place. It cherry-picks things from Tractatus that we should keep in mind when using language while accepting that Wittgenstein’s later theory is superior in explaining the overall nature of language. So, I am not claiming that two seemingly contradictory theories can coexist in terms of fundamental truth, but rather that one is more true, and the other is practically valuable, so both are worth keeping in mind.

Though I will be trying to stay on this track, I will frequently deviate from the central argument to express my own ideas about the fundamental nature of language. Perhaps that will be the focus.

Current Methods of Usage (forthcoming)

Britton William FrostLeave a comment

The following is an introduction to my forthcoming essay called Current Methods of Usage. It is a heavily revised continuation of work I did as an undergraduate that explores the fundamental nature of language.  If it sounds like something that you might be interested in reading and discussing, stay tuned!

“At two different points in his research, Ludwig Wittgenstein held conflicting theories about the nature of language. These two philosophies arguably gave rise to the two schools of thought that are still prominent today: analytical and continental. We associate Wittgenstein’s early work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, with the analytical school of thought. This work argued for a very black-and-white “picture theory” of language that states that language’s foundations are in the logically constructed picture of the world that we attempt to describe; there is a necessary relationship between terms and the things in the world that they refer to. We associate Wittgenstein’s later work, Philosophical Investigations, with the continental school of thought. This work argued for a much more open-ended theory of language that states that meaning is in a constant state of flux, according to its context. We play “language games” in order to communicate as precisely as we can within a given context.

My purpose in this forthcoming essay is to show that Wittgenstein’s two theories of language can, in some sense, coexist, and more broadly, that the respective schools of thought that they gave rise to must coexist if we are to advance thought. I will do so by devising two concepts. The first concept is called the logical reductionism fallacy, which will expose the problems of applying strict a priori ideals to meaning, in this case, as applied to language. The second concept, which will be the focus of this essay, is called current methods of usage. It will allow me to explain that, though we need to apply certain logical skills – that the “picture theory” can provide – in order to use language properly in a particular time and place, we should accept that Wittgenstein’s later theory much more accurately describes the general nature of language.”