Debunking the “Free Will Illusion”

The other day, I read this PsyBlog article that attempts to explain a psychological study which, according to the author, seems to imply that humans are mechanical robots merely controlled by neuronal impulses in our brains, and that free will is an illusory conception that humans have constructed to cope with death. There have been numerous studies, including the one described in that article, which show that neurons in the brain begin to fire before the person can report being conscious of their decision to pick up a pencil or before they can predict exactly which one of five circles on a computer screen changes color, for examples (the latter example is the experiment referred to in the article). The article also mentions the term ‘unconscious’ several times, and the usages imply that ‘unconscious’ should be defined merely as ‘the mechanical workings of the brain’. My aims in this post are to explain why that is an oversimplified and unsophisticated definition of ‘unconscious’, and also to suggest, partly on that basis, why these studies not only do not imply that free will is an illusion, but that they have virtually no bearing on what constitutes free will to begin with.

A Less Trivial Definition of ‘Unconscious’

There is one thing that the article (and anyone who would agree with it) gets right: we are not in total control of what we see, understand, and believe. However, this truth cannot be maintained to every degree of analysis imaginable (the highest degree being the ontology of free will and morals, arguably). This raises a semantic problem. Everyone has their own definition of what constitutes “unconscious” and even “free will”. The level of analysis that the article attempts to operate on is one of moral ontology, but it fails. Instead, it maintains the assumption that all that exists in us are mechanistic processes, and those processes are “unconscious”. We are our brains, and our brains are computer processors that take in data and organize that data for output, and when we are faced with stimuli relevant to our experiences, we merely react in accordance with our pre-organized data. Eh, well, partially correct! We are more nature than nurture after all. But, how does this imply that we don’t have free will? Let’s step back first. What can we infer from this article’s usage of ‘unconscious’?

“Neural activity is unconscious”, materialists will hold. Yes, we know that to the same extent that we know that digestion in the intestines is unconscious, and it need not be overstated. It is merely a biological process per se. However, biological processes tell us very little about our conscious world — the reality that we actually experience. They presuppose that the origins of our behaviors and decisions are pre-programmed inside our brains, and the neuronal activity is the first step in activating those programs (which we call decisions). This is an assumption, albeit a rather interesting one. Those who believe that this process is the causal origin of our behavior commit the most basic fallacy in science: correlation without causation. Why do they assume that the brain is the beginning when the brain requires the world to gather information to begin with, and why would anyone assume that we are disconnected from objective reality to the extent that we are separate and not intimately connected to it in a way that our actions most likely have ancient origins. What is left over when we commit to this materialist view of perception?

A lot, I would say. In fact, one can control some aspects of even these biological processes. If I am lactose-intolerant, I can consciously avoid dairy so my digestion maintains a regular track. In the same way, I can somewhat control what my brain “processes”. If I am at a music festival, for example, and I have to decide whether I want to attend the concert of a band I have already seen or that of a new band I haven’t yet seen, my decision will affect what my brain processes. If I choose the familiar option, I will go into the show having certain expectations based on what I have already processed from previous shows of theirs. If I choose the unfamiliar band, (which is statistically less likely), then I am choosing a new path. My experience will not be dictated by any biases, and, in a way, the show will present a challenge — a challenge to what I already know and expect in music generally. It is not only those biological processes that are necessarily unconscious, but so are some of the decisions we make which come prior to those processes. We can, however, take control of those decisions if we think about learning and decision-making in the right way. So, let’s think about it like this: perhaps the origins of our behavior and decisions are in the world, but not in the minute-by-minute, stimuli-centric world that neuro-materialists would like to believe. If it were that way, then we would not even be able to inquire about how our minds work as we’re doing now (which requires temporarily stepping outside of them), much less to overcome social pressure to leave our friend group at a music festival to see the band we want to see, alone.

What I am dancing around now is the more nuanced meaning of ‘unconscious’ that we find in fringe psychology and spiritual circles.

“To know oneself is to make the unconscious conscious.” — C.G. Jung

We can observe, in my field of birth chart astrology, that people live out their charts until they seek knowledge about them. The birth chart represents one’s innate set of perceptions and predispositions for responding to different aspects of reality. Someone is likely even living out their transits when they come to me for consultation — i.e. there is something external compelling them to learn about themselves at a particular time — but free will is clearly expressed in how they make use of the information I give them. The better one knows oneself, the more opportunities they will have to express their free will. There is still no guarantee, however, that they will. As I always say, I don’t tell people what to do; I help them own what they choose to do.

There is a strong case that it is not when someone is acting from their proclivities, but rather only when someone acts against what is normal and comfortable for them, that they are expressing free will. This “opposition to the self” kind of behavior must be founded on moral principles, boundaries, or in the very least, external rules. These represent three different degrees of self-governance and the spectrum of our human relationship to that concept, and only one fully shows that free will can be expressed in any case. In the next post, I will describe these three levels and show the connection from free will to that one of them, perhaps revealing something about the origins of autonomous decision-making that evaded us in the beginning of this article.