One similarity between Wittgenstein’s two main works, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations, is that, in both, he concerned himself with this very question: “How are we to say what we mean?” However, the reasons for this concern were different in each work, so the question itself changed over time (and this is an example of how meaning changes; the same sentence can mean two different things under different circumstances).
Tractatus took for granted two fundamental assumptions about language: that it has a quantifiable logical construction and that it is causally related to our perception of the world. The latter assumption seems undoubtedly true, but the former, not so much, even though the latter seems to be contingent on the former. He says in 1.1 of Tractatus, “The world is the totality of facts, not things.”, and then in 4.001, “The totality of propositions is the language.” In other words, if Wittgenstein remains consistent, reality is comprised of all states of affairs about which propositions can be made (in case this is not already clear from my previous description). Language is a puzzle that one must figure out if he is to communicate effectively. One may only think and speak according to those factual states of affairs in the world. That is to say, because language is something of a logical system, one may only think and speak logically. This brings me to the minor concept of this essay: logical reductionism.
Logic: The art of thinking and reasoning in strict accordance with the limitations and incapacities of the human misunderstanding.” -Ambrose Bierce, The Devil’s Dictionary (1911)
Logical reductionism can be broadly defined as “rigid belief in an a priori system, even in contexts which it is inapplicable”. This term is very broad, for it includes any case where a dogmatic ideology guides understanding without exception. Logical reductionism is, in many cases but very generally, similar to the single-cause fallacy. The single-cause fallacy is also called false-dilemma, false cause, correlation-causation, or black-and-white fallacy. It states: because y follows x, then x must have caused y. For example, if a man who is known to have a heart condition dies in his sleep, his family members might conclude that the death was due to a heart attack. The pathologist may or may not be able to confirm this. Regardless, the family have come to an agreement on what the cause of death was, assuming that there was only one cause, when in fact there were probably multiple necessary contributing factors.
The main difference between the single-cause fallacy and logical reductionism is that the former deals with a one’s lack of ability to use a specific type of reasoning, and the latter deals broadly with one’s rigid belief in a system. The latter, as I will explain, is much more problematic.
The type of reasoning that is hindered by the single-cause fallacy is not one that warrants an immediate judgment. Rather, it is a mode of perception that allows one to see multiple possibilities and make connections in an unfamiliar situation. Proponents of Jungian psychology call this mode of perception extroverted intuition (or Ne). The tendency to neglect this perception is called, in some circles of psychology, explanation freeze. Anyone can fall victim to explanation freeze (i.e. get fixated on a singular explanation of a problem), no matter their ability to use Ne, but Jung would suggest that only half of the human population possesses the natural ability to exercise Ne at all, and a only very small percentage can exercise it consciously and effectively. Everyone else is only able to use it to a very small degree or merely act as if they use it. Upon close observation of one’s social environment, this actually seems to be true. Based on the limited formal research that has been done on this by Julia Galef and other contributors at clearthinking.org, it also has great potential to be confirmed. However, I am not making a case for that at this time.
If the ability to use Ne is indeed innate, one cannot have any difficulty in achieving that which he has no potential to achieve (i.e. overcoming single-cause). On the other hand, one’s ability to use extroverted thinking may not be innate, and everyone might have the potential to improve the skill. If this is the case, then everyone would have the potential to exercise Ne with practice. In fact, there are outlets online that can help with this: wi-phi; ClearThinking; YLFI. Either way one should be able to hold the position that it is generally more difficult to overcome logical reductionism than the single-cause fallacy.
A further description of Ne: (People who have a strong tendency for extroverted intuition have been found to naturally exhibit brain activity that is similar to that of someone who is under the influence of a hallucinogen like psilocybin, ayahuasca, or LSD. Despite the public’s general negative attitude toward the use of hallucinogens, they can have some very positive long-term effects. They can broaden one’s scope of the world, allow him to see multiple possibilities in any situation, make him realize the interconnection of humans and nature, etc. This is no delusion, but rather, a unique type of clarity which can, albeit more difficultly, be achieved without the use of such substances. I do not promote the use of hallucinogens mainly because their effects can be achieved through other means (intensive meditation, introspection, etc.). I have only used this example to further explain what it is like to have Ne “brain wiring”. Take it however you prefer.)
Logical Reductionism is more broad than single-cause, but as stated earlier, it is closely related to it. I used the example of the family of the man who died. It should now be clear why their assessment of the death is guided by poor reasoning: They are not medical professionals and do not realize the broad range of issues that normally contribute to an unexpected death. In such a moment of stress, their perception becomes narrow. More generally, they may not have the natural tendency to use Ne to a large extent to begin with. This is fine.
The pathologist, on the other hand, has no excuse (even if he no more possesses the natural ability to use Ne). If he outright agrees that heart attack was the cause of the man’s death, he likely does so for one of two reasons: because he simply wants to satisfy the family so he no longer has to continue the conversation, or because he believes so dogmatically in the practices of pathology that it can provide all of the answers on a strictly biological basis. It is in the latter case that he is being ideological, and therefore committing logical reductionism, whether he is aware of it or not. Either approach to the question is not very professional in my view, especially the latter because it is founded in ignorance. (This is a common problem in medical practice that I may address after further research at some other time.)
Logical reductionism is a widespread epidemic which epitomizes the naivety of human perception. There are no matters in the universe (medical, scientific, philosophical, religious, political, etc.) that can be absolutely confirmed or refuted by the application of an a priori system. To think otherwise is to commit the fallacy of logical reductionism. It is incredibly arrogant to claim that we humans have the potential to understand the nature of anything via systems that we have created for the sole purpose of making it easier for us to relate to those very states of affairs that we previously accepted as unfathomable. Language is not one of those systems. This is precisely what Tractatus gets wrong.
(In Philosophical Investigations, that assumption was done away with. Wittgenstein realized that language is not a puzzle; it is a tool. The challenge to say what we mean is not to figure out something fundamental about the language, but rather to work with others to communicate what we mean on a more holistic, interpersonal level. We use language; we need not deconstruct it.)
In reductive biology, researchers tend to look for specific genes to explain traits, birth deficiencies, and mutations. Genes are thought to be the most elementary autonomous anatomical units. The line of reasoning is that by reducing the condition down to its fundamental parts (simples), then we might gain a fundamental understanding of the whole being (composite). (This line of reasoning commits the fallacy of composition. Composition seeks to prove that the whole is merely the sum of all of its parts. Division seeks to prove the opposite.) The extent of their findings have been merely correlative. The only thing we absolutely know genes to do are to guide the synthesis of proteins. These proteins make up only a portion of DNA and RNA construction. DNA then provides a home base for storage and transmission of “genetic information”. RNA is then required to carry out functions of that information (e.g. traits and maintaining genetic stability of the organism). So, the gene’s role in developing traits is indirect and not very clear. It is something like: If A and X, then B; if B and Y, then C; if C and Z, then D. A (genes), therefore D (traits). It is becoming increasingly clear that reducing a composite to a simple does not help us to explain the broader functions of the composite, and vise-versa.
I’ll use a less complicated example from biology. Different types of cells carry out different and specific types of functions: Red blood cells distribute oxygen throughout the body, white blood cells fight infection, nerve cells transmit sensory impulses to the brain, skin cells shed and regenerate to protect the inside of the body from the outside world, etc. But, do the sum of all of these basic components equate to a human? The answer is ‘no’ because the range of functions that the organism can perform is much more extensive and diverse than that of the sum of all of its constituent parts. The human being (especially the brain) is so complex and mysterious because it cannot be quantified in this way. Any use of mathematics in biology is simply an estimation, and at best, a guideline. To believe otherwise is to commit logical reductionism.
The same is the case with language. Wittgenstein states in Philosophical Investigations:
47. But what are the simple constituent parts of which reality is composed? – What are the simple constituent parts of a chair? – The pieces of wood from which it is assembled? Or the molecules, or the atoms? ‘Simple’ means: not composite. And here is the point: in what sense ‘composite’? It makes no sense at all to speak absolutely of the ‘simple parts of a chair’.
48. …We use the word ‘composite’ (and therefore the word ‘simple’) in an enormous number of different and differently related ways. To the philosophical question ‘Is the visual image of this (chair) composite, and what are its constituent parts?’ the correct answer is ‘That depends on what you understand to be composite. (And that, of course, is not an answer to, but a rejection of, the question.)”
In this later work, Wittgenstein came to deny the existence of simples and composites in the way we describe reality. It would be because of the logic-contingent construction by which we might misunderstand language that we might disagree with him. Language no longer dictates one’s understanding of the world. Rather, the world controls the fluidity of language because the world controls us, whether we are able to admit it or not. Any attempt for us to control the world will have horrific ramifications (e.g. effects of agriculture on climate change). We adapt our language to our world out of necessity.
To be continued…
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