Current Methods of Usage (Part 1) – Introduction

At two different points in his life, Ludwig Wittgenstein held conflicting theories about the nature of language. These two philosophies arguably gave rise to two schools of thought, each with an extensive range of subfields, that are still prominent today: analytical and continental (this is why Wittgenstein is so widely considered the most influential philosopher of the twentieth century). We associate Wittgenstein’s early work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, with the analytical school of thought. This work argued for a “picture theory” of language that states that language’s foundations are in the logically constructed picture of the world that we attempt to describe; there is a necessary relationship between terms and the things in the world that they refer to. We associate Wittgenstein’s later work, Philosophical Investigations, with the continental school of thought. This work argued for a much more open-ended theory of language that states that meaning is not fixed; it fluctuates depending on its context. We play language games in order to communicate as precisely as we can within a given context. In either case, saying what we mean is a difficult task.

My purpose in this essay is to show that Wittgenstein’s two theories of language can, in some sense, coexist. If I am successful, one should be able to infer that the respective schools of thought that they gave rise to must coexist if we are to advance thought. Perhaps I will elaborate on the latter point at a later date, but for now, I will defend the former by devising two concepts. The first concept is called the logical-reductionism fallacy, which will expose the problems of applying strict a priori ideals to meaning, in this case, as applied to language. The second concept, which will be the focus of this essay, is called current methods of usage. It states that there is indeed a proper way to use language in a particular time and place. It cherry-picks things from Tractatus that we should keep in mind when using language while accepting that Wittgenstein’s later theory is superior in explaining the overall nature of language. So, I am not claiming that two seemingly contradictory theories can coexist in terms of fundamental truth, but rather that one is more true, and the other is practically valuable, so both are worth keeping in mind.

Though I will be trying to stay on this track, I will frequently deviate from the central argument to express my own ideas about the fundamental nature of language. Perhaps that will be the focus.

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